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Summary
In March 2005, a World Trade Organization (WTO) appellate panel ruled against
the United States in a dispute settlement case (DS267) brought by Brazil against certain
aspects of the U.S. cotton program.1  To comply with the “prohibited subsidy” portion
of the WTO ruling, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns announced (July 5,
2005) that the Administration was sending proposed statutory changes to Congress
including elimination of the Step 2 cotton program, removal of a 1% cap on fees charged
under the GSM-102 export credit guarantee program, and termination of the GSM-103
export credit guarantee program.  In light of USDA’s proposed changes, and with the
expectation that they will be fully implemented in an expeditious manner, Brazil has
temporarily suspended its pursuit of WTO-sanctioned retaliatory trade measures against
U.S. agricultural products.  The U.S. National Cotton Council (NCC) has announced its
opposition to the removal of the Step 2 cotton program whose elimination is contained
in the pending budget reconciliation bill, S. 1932, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.
Additional permanent modifications to U.S. farm programs may still be needed to fully
comply with the “actionable subsidies” portion of the WTO ruling.  Such changes
ultimately would be decided by Congress.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
In late 2002, Brazil initiated a WTO dispute settlement case against specific
provisions of the U.S. cotton program.  On September 8, 2004, a WTO dispute settlement
panel released its ruling on the case, finding against the United States on several key
issues.  On March 3, 2005, the WTO panel’s ruling was upheld on appeal.  On March 21,
2005, the panel reports were adopted by the WTO membership, initiating a sequence of
events, under WTO dispute settlement rules, whereby the United States is expected to
bring its policies into line with the panel’s recommendations or negotiate a mutually
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acceptable settlement with Brazil.  U.S. failure to comply could result in WTO-sanctioned
trade retaliation by Brazil against certain U.S. agricultural exports.
The U.S. response to the WTO cotton ruling is being watched closely by developing
countries, particularly by a consortium of four African cotton-producing countries which
has submitted its own proposal to the WTO calling for a global agreement to end all
production-related support for cotton growers of all WTO-member countries.2  In
addition, other WTO members are likely to evaluate the U.S. response as an indicator of
whether the United States is prepared to make substantial cuts in market-distorting
agricultural subsidies as part of the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations.
WTO Panel’s Recommendation
The WTO panel recommended that the United States withdraw those support
programs identified as “prohibited” subsidies by July 1, 2005, and to remove the
prejudicial effects of those programs identified as “actionable” subsidies by September
21, 2005 (six months after the appellate report’s adoption).  Each of these subsidy types
—  prohibited and actionable — involves a different type of response and a different
timetable for implementing that response. 
Prohibited Subsidies.  Two types of prohibited subsidies were identified by the
WTO panel: unscheduled export subsidies (i.e., subsidies applied to commodities not
listed on a country’s WTO schedule or made in excess of the value listed on the
schedule);3 and import substitution subsidies which refer to subsidies paid to domestic
users to encourage the use of domestic products over imported products.  Both Step 2
export payments and export credit guarantees were found to operate as prohibited export
subsidies.  Step 2 domestic user payments were found to operate as prohibited import
substitution subsidies.  Under the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, prohibited subsidies
are treated with greater urgency than actionable subsidies — in particular, they are given
a shorter time frame for compliance.4 
Step 2 Program.  Step 2 payments are part of special cotton marketing provisions
authorized under U.S. farm program legislation to keep U.S. upland cotton competitive
on the world market.5  Step 2 payments are made  to exporters and domestic mill users to
compensate them for their purchase of U.S. upland cotton which tends to be priced higher
than the world market price.  
CRS-3
6 For information on these programs, see USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Export Credit
Guarantee Programs,” at [http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/default.htm]. 
7 As defined in Article 1 of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
8 For more information on these programs, see CRS Report RS21779, Farm Commodity
Programs: Direct Payments, Counter-Cyclical Payments, and Marketing Loans.
9 Report of the Panel, WTO, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.1503, p. 354.
Export Credit Guarantee Programs.  USDA’s export credit guarantee
programs (GSM-102, GSM 103, and SCGP) underwrite credit extended by private U.S.
banks to approved foreign banks for purchases of U.S. food and agricultural products by
foreign buyers.6  GSM-102 covers credit terms up to three years, while GSM-103 covers
longer credit terms up to 10 years.  The Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP)
insures short-term, open account financing designed to make it easier for exporters to sell
U.S. food products overseas.  
The WTO panel found that all three export credit programs effectively functioned
as export subsidies because the financial benefits returned to the government by these
programs failed to cover their long-run operating cost.  Furthermore, the panel found that
this export-subsidy aspect of export credit guarantees applies, not just to cotton, but to all
recipient commodities that benefit from U.S. commodity support programs.  If a
commodity that benefits from program payments is unscheduled (i.e., not listed on a
country’s WTO schedule) then, according to the WTO panel, it is not eligible for U.S.
export credit guarantees so long as the credit guarantees continue to function as an
implicit export subsidy.  In contrast, the panel ruled that the subsidized export of
scheduled agricultural products that remain within their export subsidy schedules do not
circumvent U.S. export commitments and are not subject to trade remedy actions.  
Actionable Subsidies.  Any subsidy may be challenged in the WTO, i.e., it is
“actionable,” if it fulfills the WTO definition of a subsidy7 and is alleged to cause adverse
effects including serious prejudice to the interests of other WTO members.  Actionable
U.S. subsidies were identified as contributing to serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil
by depressing prices for cotton on the world market during the marketing years 1999-
2002.  Specifically, this involved those U.S. subsidy measures singled out as price-
contingent (i.e., dependent on changes in current market prices), e.g., marketing loan
provisions, Step 2 payments, market loss payments, and counter-cyclical payments
(CCPs).8  The panel recommended that, upon adoption of its final report, the United
States take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or to withdraw the subsidies.9
U.S. Response
With respect to implementing changes to the “prohibited subsidies,” the
Administration is limited to how much response can be accomplished through altering the
program’s operation administratively, and how much response requires new legislation.
The Step 2 cotton program was authorized by the 2002 farm act (P.L. 107-171; Sect.
1207)  and would necessitate new legislation to remove or alter its implementation. The
Administration has more discretion over the implementation of the export credit guarantee
program, since it may choose simply not to operate the program or to provide credit only
for WTO scheduled commodities.  However, if the Administration intends to use export
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credit guarantees for the current list of supported commodities in otherwise unrestricted
amounts, then some statutory changes will be needed to eliminate the alleged “subsidy”
component of export credit guarantees.  This is because user fees for GSM-102, the
primary export credit program, are capped at 1% of the value of the export product.
Higher fees are needed to ensure that the financial benefits returned by these programs
fully cover their long-run operating costs; thereby eliminating their subsidy component.
On June 30, 2005, USDA announced that beginning July 1, the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) would use a risk-based fee structure for the GSM-102 and SCGP
programs.10  As a result, fee rates are now based on the country risk that CCC is
undertaking, as well as the repayment term and frequency under the guarantee. The new
structure responds to a key finding by the WTO that the fees charged by the programs
should be risk based.  In addition, the CCC stopped accepting applications for payment
guarantees under GSM-103. Any remaining country and regional allocations for GSM-
103 coverage under FY2005 program announcements were reallocated to the existing
GSM-102 program for that country or region. 
On July 5, 2005, Secretary Johanns announced that the Administration was sending
three proposed statutory changes to Congress to comply with the WTO case:  1)
elimination of the Step 2 program; 2) removal of the 1% cap on fees that can be charged
under the GSM-102 program; and 3) termination of the GSM-103 program.11  According
to Secretary Johanns the proposed changes were worked out in collaboration with U.S.
industry groups.  Furthermore, Secretary Johanns said that repealing the Step 2 program
would remove both the prohibited export and import substitution subsidies and address
issues related to the actionable subsidies (i.e., suppression of cotton prices in world
markets); eliminating the 1% fee cap would make the Export Credit Guarantee Program
more risk-based; and terminating the GSM-103 program would reinforce the recent U.S.
decision to stop using longer-term export credit guarantees. 
A provision repealing the Step 2 program, effective August 1, 2006, is currently
contained in the conference report on the pending budget reconciliation bill, S. 1932, the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.  The conference report was passed by both the House and
the Senate in late December 2005, but further action must be taken by the House because
of changes to the final bill made by the Senate unrelated to the Step 2 program.  The
National Cotton Council (NCC) announced its opposition to the immediate elimination
of cotton’s Step 2 program as proposed by USDA.12  The NCC is an industry group
representing cotton producers, ginners, warehousers, merchants, cottonseed
processors/dealers, cooperatives and textile manufacturers.  NCC chairman Woods
Eastland expressed concern that the program not be changed in the middle of the
marketing year when it could have disruptive effects on cotton producers and users alike.
Eastland expressed the NCC’s interest in working with Congress in effecting a “fair and
appropriate” response to the WTO case.  However, in previous testimony to Congress the
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NCC leadership has expressed a consistent interest in participating in the WTO’s rules-
based international trading system and in maintaining an effective U.S. cotton program
that complies with WTO rules.13
Brazil’s Response
Prohibited Subsidies.  Because prohibited export subsidies had not been
removed by July 1, 2005, Brazil requested (July 4, 2005) authorization from the WTO to
impose countermeasures against U.S. cotton subsidies valued at $3 billion.  According
to WTO rules, trade sanctions are limited to a value not to exceed the level of lost
benefits.  Brazil proposed to suspend tariff concessions as well as obligations under the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services until the United States withdrew the exports subsidies
identified by the WTO, in an amount estimated at $3 billion corresponding to: (1) Step
2 payments made in the most recently concluded marketing year (2004/05), and (2) the
total of exporter applications received under the three export credit guarantee programs,
for all unscheduled commodities and for rice, for the most recent fiscal year (2004).14  The
United States objected to Brazil’s proposed sanctions amount, and requested WTO
arbitration (July 19, 2005; WT/DS267/24).  However, the United States and Brazil
reached a procedural agreement (August 18, 2005; WT/DS267/25) temporarily
suspending arbitration proceedings in so far as the prohibited subsidies are involved.  
Actionable Subsidies.  To date, the Administration has not announced any
specific initiative to address the programs deemed to cause prejudicial impact to Brazil’s
trade interest.  Because the prejudicial effects of the price-contingent actionable subsidies
had not been removed by September 21, 2005, Brazil requested authorization from the
WTO to impose additional countermeasures valued at $1 billion as retaliation against the
programs causing serious prejudice.  Once again, the United States requested WTO
arbitration (Oct 18, 2005; WT/DS267/27) over the level of the proposed sanctions.
However, on November 21, 2005, the United States and Brazil reached another
procedural agreement (December 7, 2005; WT/DS267/29) suspending further retaliation
proceedings in so far as the actionable subsidies are involved.  
Outlook.  Brazil continues to undertake the procedural steps necessary to preserve
its authority under the auspices of the WTO to retaliate in the event of noncompliance by
the United States; although, Brazil has shown a willingness to permit the U.S. legislative
process to make the changes needed to bring its farm programs into compliance with the
WTO ruling, even if this process extends well beyond the deadlines established under the
WTO dispute settlement ruling.  However, reportedly Brazil may soon restart one or both
of the arbitration proceedings.15
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Potential Effects to U.S. Agriculture of Proposed Changes
Eliminating the Step 2 Program.  The Step 2 program has channeled nearly $3
billion to the U.S. cotton industry since 1996.16  According to the USDA’s chief
economist, Keith Collins, ending the Step 2 program would result in slightly lower
domestic prices — by two to three cents per pound — and higher export prices for U.S.
cotton.17  But he also anticipated that declines in producer prices would be likely to trigger
an increase in CCP to U.S. cotton farmers that would offset losses from lower prices.  An
analysis by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) found a -1.3¢
decline in U.S. farm price and a 0.4¢ rise in international prices due to the elimination of
Step 2 payments.18 
Changing GSM-102 and Terminating GSM-103.  In FY2004, about 11% of
U.S. cotton exports were facilitated with export credit guarantees — FY2004 U.S. cotton
exports were valued at $4,511 million of which $480 million were facilitated with GSM-
102 export credit guarantees and another $8 million relied on SCGP guarantees.  Redesign
of export credit guarantees (as discussed above) would likely have a small but negative
effect on U.S. cotton exports, thus reinforcing the results of removing Step 2.  
Role of Congress
Ultimately Congress is responsible for passing farm program legislation that
complies with U.S. commitments in international trade agreements.  Passage of the
pending budget reconciliation bill, S. 1932, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, would
eliminate the cotton Step 2 provisions.  Further statutory changes will be needed to
eliminate the alleged “subsidy” component of export credit guarantees as represented by
the 1% cap on user fees.  In addition, changes to those programs deemed part of the
actionable subsidy ruling, i.e., CCP and marketing loan provision, would also necessitate
legislative action.  The legislation authorizing current farm programs is not set to expire
until 2007.  Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Saxby Chambliss has said that he
would review the Administration’s proposal and work with industry and the
Administration to identify the appropriate legislative solution for complying with the
WTO ruling.19
